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Why the Oslo Accords Should
be Abrogated by ]Israel
Louis Ren6 Beres'
The Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
("PLO") violate international law.' Israel, therefore, is now obligated to abrogate
these nontreaty agreements.2 A comparable argument could be made regarding
PLO obligations, but this would make little jurisprudential sense in light of that
nonstate party's intrinsic incapacity to enter into a legal arrangement ith Israel. 3
* Louis Ren6 Beres Nvas educated at Princeton (PILD. 1971) and is the author of
fourteen books and several hundred articles dealing with international law. His forthcom-
ing book is titled FoRcE, ORDER, Am JusnfcE: hTrEmkTiO,"L LAW INiAo OFATRccrrY.
Prof. Beres currently teaches in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University.
1. Oslo I is generally known as the Declaration of Principles. Israel and the PLO
concluded and signed Oslo I on August 19, 1993 and resigned it in Washington, D.C. on
September 13, 1993. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreements,
Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-Palestine, 32 LL.M. 1525. The parties signed Oslo II, the Interim
Agreement, in Washington on September 28, 1995. For a complete compendium of the
documentary record, up to the signing of Oslo II, see IN s-mU'm FOR PALESI-s STumDIs,
Tim Pns.n -IRAmi PEAcE Acpa mr (rev. 2d ed. 1994). An integral part of the
Oslo Accords now includes the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, which
the parties initialed on January 15, 1997. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in He-
bron, Jan. 15, 1997, Isr.-PLO <http:/wwAv.jpost.com/archive/15.Jan.1997/newstarticle-
8.ntml7> (in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and, in particular,
Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement, both parties agreed on this Protocol for
the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron).
2. Even if these agreements were authentic treaties, they nould not be valid or
binding. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is always
subject to peremptory expectations: "A treaty is void W, at the time of its conclusion, it con-
flicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 [hereinafter Vienna Con-
vention]. According to Article 53 of this Convention, "A peremptory norm of general inter-
national law is a norm recognized by the international community of States as a vhole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and vhich can be modified only by a subse-
quent norm of general international law having the same character." Id. This article goes
on to consider why the Oslo Accords are in violation of pertinent peremptory norms.
3. Augmenting this incapacity is a related problem: the unequal obligations imposed
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Taken by itself, the fact that the Oslo accords do not constitute authentic trea-
ties under the Vienna Convention4 - because they link a state with a nonstate
party -does not call for abrogation. But as the nonstate party in this case just
happens to be a terrorist organization5 whose leaders must be punished for their
by law on nonstate parties to agreements. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Tel-Oren, the plaintiffs were Israeli survivors and representatives
of persons murdered in a terrorist bus attack in Israel in 1978. Id. at 775. In a concurring
opinion, Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards stated: "I do not believe the law of nations im-
poses the same responsibility or liability on nonstate actors, such as the PLO, as it does on
states and persons acting under color of state law." Id. at 776. This suit for compensatory
and punitive damages named the PLO, as well as the Palestine Information Office, the Na-
tional Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine Congress of North America as de-
fendants. Id. at 775. What this means, for the subject at hand - the lack of validity of the
Oslo Accords under international law - is that the Palestine Authority ('TA ') that is the
nonstate party to Oslo I and II cannot be held jurisprudentially to the same standards of
accountability as the State of Israel.
4. According to article 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
treaty is always an international agreement "concluded between States." See Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 3, art. 2(a), at 681.
5. See REPORT OF THE COMIiTrEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HousE oF
REPRES ENTATIWES ON H.R. 1561 TOGETimR wrm MINORrrY AND ADDITIONAL ViEws, H.R.
REP. No. 104-128(), at 403 (1995) (reafflrming the United States policy that no officer or
employee of the United States Government shall negotiate with the PLO until the PLO re-
nounces the use of terrorism). Regarding the criminal responsibility of this terrorist organi-
zation for crimes committed under the direction of Yasser Arafat, the legal principle is es-
tablished unambiguously that orders pursuant to "domestic law" (in this case, by analogy,
to PLO "law") are no defense to violations of international law. See Vienna Convention,
supra note 3, art. 27, at 339 (noting that a party may not invoke the provisions of internal
law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty). See also REsTATMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREI GNRELATIONS LAW § 3.2 (1965) (observing the domestic law of a state is not a de-
fense to a violation of international law). On the principle of command responsibility (re-
spondeat superior) as it pertains to Arafat and the PLO terrorist organization, see In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1945), High Command Case, 10th Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Law No. 10, at 3 (Oct. 27-28,
1948), William V. O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60
GEo. L.J. 605, 619-29 (1971), and Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for
War Crimes, 62 Mi. L. REv. 1 (1973). The direct legal responsibility of Yasser Arafat for
crimes of his terrorist organization is altogether clear. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TIM JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEP. OF ARMY, REPORT ON IRAQ, WAR CRIMEs (DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM) 13 (1992) [hereinafter ARMY WAR CRIMES REPORT] (holding Sad-
dam Hussein responsible for war crimes due to the widespread and methodical nature of
Iraqi violations of international law).
6. See Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.
Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78. U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). An-
other resolution affirms that a refusal to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and pun-
ishment of persons guilty of war crimes is contrary to the United Nations Charter "and to
generally recognized norms of international law." G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th sess.,
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egregious crimes,7 any agreement with this party that offers rewnrds rather than
punishments is entirely null and void. Significantly, in view of the peremptory
expectation known in law as Nullum crimen sine poena ("No crime without a
punishment"), 8 the state party in such an agreement - here the State of Israel -
violates international law by honoring the agreement
According to Principle I of the binding Nuremberg Principles: "Any parson
who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is respon-
s ible therefore and liable to punishment." 9 It is from this principle, which applies
Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). As to the responsibility of states toward
Geneva Law in particular, common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions addresses the ob-
ligation of all signatories "to respect and to ensure respect for the Conventions in all cir-
cumstances." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3578, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288. Common Article
146 of the Geneva Civilian Convention recognizes that "Each High Contracting Party sall
be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered
to be committed ... grave breaches... ." Id. art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at
386. See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, GA. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23d sess., Supp. No. 18, at
40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
7. International law presumes solidarity between all states in the fight against egre-
gious crimes. See Tim INsTTumrs oF GAius AND JuSTanAN, Tnm TNavE TABLES Aim
CXVIEAmn CXXVIlAlmNovms C.T. (Lambert Mears trans., Win. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc.
1994) (1882); 2 Hu-oNis GROTu, DE JuRE BErI ET PAcis LmRE TRES, 238-338 (William
Whetwell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press n.d.) (1855); E. De Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens,
reprinted in CLASsIcS OF Im ENATIONAL LAw 197-212 (James Bron Scott ed., 1910). The
case for universal jurisdiction over egregious crimes, wiiich derives from the presumption
of solidarity, is found in the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. SeC Anly.V WARn
CRmms R nPoRT, supra note 6, at 1 (listing the four Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949 as: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). These Conventions unambiguously impose
upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain "grave breaches" of
their rules. The term "grave breaches" applies to certain infractions of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977. See Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tion of 12 August 1949, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Proto-
cols].
8. Tim HAMMURABI CODE (Chilperiz Edmards trans., Kenniikat Press 1971) (1904)
and REuvEN YARON, THE LAWS OF ESHNUNNA (1969) contain the earliest e.pressions of
Nullum crimen sine poena, although there also exists the even-earlier Code of Ur-Nammu
(c. 2100 BCE) and, of course, the law of exact retaliation or Lex Talionis presented in
three separate passages of the Torah. It follows that the Rabin/Peres'Neta*-ahu govern-
ments' willful indifference to binding legal expectations of "No crime without a punish-
ment" is ironic because that peremptory principle has prominent Jevish origins.
9. The U.N. General Assembly affirmed the principles of international law recog-
nized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal. See Af-
firmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by The Charter of the Nurem-
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with particular relevance to Hostes humani generis0 ("Common enemies of hu-
mankind") and originates in three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, that
each state derives its obligation to pursue and prosecute terrorists. Hence, for Is-
rael to honor agreements with terrorists, requiring the release of thousands of ter-
rorists, is to dishonor the very meaning of international law.
Is Yasser Arafat personally a terrorist? In the United States case of Klinghoffer
v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro," the court answered in the affirmative.' 2 In the Israeli
courts, Shimon Prachick, an officer in the Israel Defense Forces ("IDF') reserves,
and Moshe Lorberaun, who was injured in a 1978 PLO bus bombing, filed a pe-
tition in May 1994 to charge Yasser Arafat with terrorism. The petition, calling
for Arafat's arrest, noted that Arafat, prima facie, was responsible for numerous
terrorist attacks in Israel and abroad. These acts included murder, airplane hi-
jacking, hostage-taking, letter-bombing and hijacking of ships on the high seas.
Dr. Ahmad Tibi, Arafat's most senior advisor, confirmed the petitioners' allega-
tion of Arafat's direct personal responsibility for terrorism. On July 13, 1994, Dr.
Tibi stated that "[tihe person responsible on behalf of the Palestinian people for
everything that was done in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Yasser Arafat.
and this man shook hands with Yitzhak Rabin."'
3
Terrorism 14 is not the only crime in which Arafat and many of the released
Palestinian prisoners are complicit. Arafat and the released prisoners committed
other related Nuremberg-category crimes, including crimes of war 5 and crimes
berg Tribunal, GA. Res. U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 1st Sess., 46th plen. mtg. at 1144, U.N.
Doc. A/236 (1946). General Assembly Resolution 177 (1) followed this affirmation of
1946. G.A. Res. 177(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d plen. mtg. at 111-12, U.N. Doc.
A/519 (1947). Resolution 177(1) directed the U.N. International Law Commission to: "(a)
Formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offenses
against the peace... and security of mankind." Id. The principles formulated are known
as the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of Nuremberg and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal. U.N. GAOR, 5th sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950).
10. See Research in International Law: Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Re-
spect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. 439, 566 (1935) ("a pirate est hostes humani generis")
(quoting King v. Marsh, 3 Bulstr. 27, 81 E.R. 23 (1615)).
11. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
12. See id. at 857 (noting that the United States does not give diplomatic relations to
the PLO).
13. See Joel Greenberg, Israel Bars Palestinian officials From Gaza, N.Y. Trams, July
14, 1994, at A7.
14. For those readers who wish to probe the authoritative inventory of particular of-
fenses that comprise the crime of terrorism, see European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
15. The laws of war, the rules ofjus in bello, comprise: (1) laws on weapons; (2) laws
on warfare; and (3) humanitarian rules. Codified primarily at the Hague and Geneva Con-
ventions, and known thereby as the Law of the Hague and the Law of Geneva, these rules
attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality and military necessity into all belligerent
calculations. See Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting Laws and Customs of War on
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against humanity.16 In this connection, the reader should recall that units of the
Palestine Liberation Army ("PLA") served with Saddam Hussein's forces in occu-
pied Kuwait. Under the legal principle of respondeat superior ("Let the Master
Answer"), 17 the PLA and Yassar Arafat are personally responsible for multiple
crimes of extraordinary horror and ferocity. 18 Not only were these offenses an af-
front to international law, but many of the terrorists whom Israel is now releasing
from its jails in furtherance of the Oslo Accords are immediately accepting high
positions in the Palestine Authority's security forces.
Even if the PLO was not a terrorist organization, the Oslo Accords would still
represent an agreement of unequal obligations, where the PLO, a nonstate party,
would not be held to the same standards of accountability under international law.
Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into
force, Jan. 26, 1910) (emphasis added).
16. For authoritative definition of crimes against humanity, see Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8,
1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
17. This principle is the converse of the doctrine of "superior orders," and is designed
to ensure that proper obedience to authority by subordinates entails no criminal conse-
quences. The superior's responsibility extends to situations wthere no affirmative orders to
commit crimes have been issued. Respondeat Superior is defined as follows
Let the master answer. This maxim means that a master is liable in ctain cases for th wrongful ads
of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent Under this doctrine master is recpomible for want
of care on servant's part tovward those to % bom the master owes duty to use care....
BLACK'S LAwDIcTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990). Understood in terms of pertinent inter-
national law, the general principle is this: A superior officer is normally liable for -%ar
crimes committed by persons under his command provided that he gave the relevant order
or that he knew of a planned violation and failed to prevent it. Moreover, a commanding
officer may be personally liable for war crimes after the events if he kmew of the commit-
ted acts but failed to institute proceedings against the perpetrators. Sce Geneva Protocols,
supra note 8, art. 86-87; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1945); IDm.oD D-r Da
Lupis, Tim LAw oF WAR 359 (1987). Paragraph 501 of the Field Manual issued by the
United States Department of the Army, based on the judgment of Japanese General Toma-
yuki Yamashita, stipulates that any commander %%to had actual kmowledge, or should have
had knowledge, that troops or other persons under his control were complicit in war crimes
and failed to take necessary steps to protect the laws of war was guilty of a war crime.
DEP'T OF AP ,Y, FEL MANuAL27-10, THELAw oFLAND AD WARFARE Tj 501, 510 (July
18, 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10] (emphasis added). See JoHN ALAN APP1-_-.M1, MInrrARY
TRIBuNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRms 349-51 (1954). Paragraph 510 denies the "act of
state" defense to such alleged criminals. It provides that, although a person vtio committed
an act constituting an international crime may have acted as head of state or as a responsi-
ble government official, he is not relieved, thereby, from responsibility for that act. FM 27-
10, supra, 510. This paragraph is drawn from Principle Ill of the Nuremberg Principles,
supra note 10, and in the formulation of these principles by the International Law Com-
mission. See Incorporation of the Principles of the Numberg Charter into International
PenalLaw, 1946-47 U.N.Y.B. 254, 260-61, U.N. Sales No. 1947.118.
18. Cf. ARuY WAR CRhm REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (attributing liability for
atrocities committed by Iraq to Saddam Hussein).
19971
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A recent federal court decision in the United States reaffirmed the premise that
agreements between nonstate and state parties impose asymmetrical compliance
expectations. 19
Since the PLO is a terrorist organization,20 Israel has no right to honor the
Oslo Accords' requirement to release convicted PLO members. No government, in
fact, has the right to lawfully pardon or grant immunity to terrorists who commit
criminally sanctionable violations of international law. This limitation derives
from a broader prohibition of pertinent peremptory rules, stemming from Higher
Law or the Law of Nature, which binds all states, including Israel. These claims
are identified in Blackstone's Commentaries,21 which acknowledge that all law
"results from those principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of every
nation agree .... 22
In apprehending and incarcerating terrorists, Israel acted not only for itself, but
on behalf of the entire community of states. Moreover, because some of the jailed
terrorists committed crimes against other states as well as against Israel, the gov-
ernment in Jerusalem cannot possibly pardon these offenses against other sover-
eigns. The Jewish State, therefore, possesses absolutely no right to grant immunity
for terrorist violations of international law. No matter what is permissible under
its own Basic Law and the Oslo Accords, freeing of terrorists is legally incorrect.
By freeing terrorists, Israel is guilty of participating in a "denial ofjustice."
Israel's obligation to abrogate the Oslo Accords, as we have seen, steins from
certain peremptory expectations of international law. Apart from such expecta-
tions, however, Israel has substantial rights of abrogation. These rights derive
from the doctrine of Rebus sic stantibus.23 Defined literally as "So long as condi-
tions remain the same, ' 24 this doctrine of changed circumstances now augments
Israel's obligations to cease compliance with Oslo. Under this doctrine, Israel's
traditional obligations to the Accords ended promptly when a fundamental change
occurred in those circumstances, existing at the effective dates of the accords,
which formed a tacit condition of the Accord's ongoing validity.2 This change, of
course, involved multiple material breaches by the PLO,26 especially those con-
19. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
20. See supra note 6.
21. See WLLLAM BLACKSTONE, CouioENTARms ON THE LAWS OF ENoLAND, OF PUBLIC
WRONGS (William Draper ed., 1900).
22. Id. at 66-67.
23. See ARIE E. DAviD, Tm STRATEGY OF TREATY TERmINATION 3-55 (1975).
24. See id. at 49 n.84 (defining rebus sic stantibus as a theory that states in economic
terms if changes in conditions are introduced into an optimum arrangement by a constraint
which violates one or more of the optimum conditions the other conditions while attain-
able, are no longer desirable).
25. See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 62, at 347.
26. See Justus Weiner, Hard Facts Meet Soft Law - The Israel-PLO Declaration of
Principles and the Prospects for Peace: A Response to Katherine W. Meighan, 35 VA. J.
INT'L L. 931, 949 (1995) (listing PLO violations as failing to amend its charter to take out
portions calling for the destruction of Israel, prosecuting Palestinians accused of cooperat-
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cerning control of anti-Israel terrorism and extradition of terrorists. In short, be-
cause of the profound changes created by the PLO in the very circumstances that
formed the cause, motive and rationale for consent, Rebus sic stantibus warrants
Israeli abrogation of the Accords.
According to Oslo expectations, Arafat should be actively committed to control
of anti-Israel terrorism. Yet, as The Jerusalem Post correctly pointed out in a mid-
March 1996 editorial, "Arafat not only shelters terrorists; he lets them incite, re-
cruit, organize, train, arm, raise funds, and launch operations from areas under
his control. This is now indisputable."2 7
The "head of the snake," admitted former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, "is in
Gaza."28 It is in PLO-controlled Gaza that Hamas, allegedly at odds with PLO, is
fomenting its terror campaign against Israel.29 Furthermore, the Palestinian secu-
rity services sustain this Hamas campaign. According to The Jerusalem Post:
It was the Hamas leadership in Gaza -which decided on terrorist strikes and
issued operational orders for the bus bombings. It was in Gaza that the Hamas
military organization trained suicide bombers and assembled explosives. It as
in Gaza that "the engineer" Yihye Ayyash found -helter until he was killed, and
where his successor Mohammed Dief has been living openly. It was in Gaza that
Arafat's Preventive Security chief wvas negotiating with Dief- a close friend -
both before and after the first bus bombing. He knew of Dief's involvement in
the bombing and did nothing either to detain him or prevent the next outrage.
30
Israel's obligation to terminate the Oslo Accords also stems from a related
principle of national self-preservation. Under this peremptory norm, a state may
unilaterally terminate any agreement following changes in conditions that make
performance of the agreement injurious to fundamental rights, especially the
rights of existence and independence. Known in law as "rights of necessity,"
3
'
this norm was explained with particular lucidity by Thomas Jefferson. In Opinion
ing with Israel, establishing PA offices in Jerusalem, failing to confiscate veapons held by
Hamas, ignoring prior legislation enacted by Israel in Gaza and Jericho, and enlisting ap-
proximately twice the number of police allowed by the Cairo Agreement).
27. Arafat's "No-Lose" Game, JERusALN.Posr, March 14, 1996, at 6.
28. Id.
29. In the future, such terrorist campaigns could even take nuclear forms. Former
Prime Minister Shimon Peres publicly acknowledged this danger when he addressed a
Joint Session of the United States Congress on December 23, 1995. Peres stated that "fun-
damentalism with a nuclear bomb is the nightmare of our age." 141 Coz:a. REc. H14257
(daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Prime Minister Peres).
30. Arafat's "No-Lose" Game, supra note 28, at 6.
31. See DAVID, supra note 24, at 19 (noting that there is a legal theory, followiing
Hegel, observing that any treaty obligation may be terminated unilaterally following
changes in conditions that make performance of the treaty injurious to basic rights). These
rights have been summarized in law as 'rights of necessity." See Research in International
Law: Lmv of Treaties, 29 Am. J. ITr'L. L. 666, 1100 (Supp. 1935) (listing additional refer-
ences regarding rights of necessity and the doctriun of rebus sic stantibus).
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on the French Treaties, written on April 28, 1793, Jefferson stated that when
performance, in international agreements, "becomes impossible, nonperformance
is not immoral. So if performance becomes self-destructive to the party, the law of
self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation to others., 32 In that same docu-
ment, Jefferson also wrote: "The nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever its
preservation and safety require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to its in-
dispensable obligations., 33 Israel, the reader should recall, has an "indispensable
obligation" to endure.34
How, exactly, do the Oslo accords impair this obligation?35 The Jerusalem
Post commented on the expected consequences of Oslo II:
[T]he implementation of Oslo 1I signals the relinquishment of Israel's security
control over the territories and the assumption of such control by the PLO. For
32. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the French Treaties, in THOMAS JEFFERSON
WRITINGS 423 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
33. Id. at 429.
34. Under international law, this obligation may even extend to preemptive use of
force against certain enemy states, a use known formally as "anticipatory self-defense." See
generally Louis Rend Beres, Striking Preemptively: Israel's Post Gulf War Options Under
International Law, in ARMs CONTROL WITHoUT GLASNOST: BuLDiNG CONFIDENCE IN THE
MDDLE EAST 129 (Israel Council on Foreign Relations 1993); Louis Rend Beres, After the
Gulf War: Israel, Preemption, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 259
(1991); Louis Rend Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, "Palestine, " and Anticipatory
Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L. L. REv. 71 (1992); Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Force, and
International Law: Assessing Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 JERUSALmVI J. INT'L. REL. I
(1991); Louis Rend Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L. & COMP.
L. 89 (1991); Louis Rend Beres and Col. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Open Forum: Reconsid-
ering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMPw. INT'L. & CoM. L.J.
437 (1995); Louis Rend Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right ofAnticipatory
Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 111 (1993); Louis
Rend Beres, Striking "First" Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under International Lmv,
14 Loy. L.A. INTr'L. & CoMP. L.J. 1 (1991). For an examination by this author of assassi-
nation as a potentially permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by Israel, see Louis
Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20
HoFsTRA L. Rv. 321 (1991).
35. It is this writer's judgment that the Oslo Accords are leading not to peace, but to
expanded anti-Israel terrorism and to catastrophic (possibly unconventional) regional war.
For a fuller account of these views, see Louis Rend Beres, Opposing the "Peace Process":
Israel, Civil Disobedience, and the Principle of a Higher Law, 13 ARmz. J. INT'L. & COMP.
L. 117 (1996); Louis Rend Beres and Zalman Shoval, On Demilitarizing a Palestinian
"Entity" and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective, 28 VAND. J.
TRASNAT'L. L. 959 (1995) [hereinafter Beres and Shoval, Demilitarizing a Palestinian
'Entity']; Louis Rend Beres, The "Peace Process" and Israel's Nuclear Strategy,
STRATEGIC Rnv., Winter 1995, at 35; Louis Rend Beres and Shlomo Gazit, The Security
and Future of Israel: An Exchange, MIDsTREAM, June/July 1995, at 15; and Louis Rend
Beres and Zalman Shoval, Why a Demilitarized Palestinian "Entity" Would Not Remain
Demilitarized, STRATEGIcREv., Summer 1995, at 73.
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the first time, there will be a large PLO army on the outsirts of Israel's major
population centers, and it vill be in control of strategic areas vtich dominate Is-
rel's heartland. Soon, Israel will be able to control neither the influx of Pales-
tinians from refugee camps in neighboring countries nor the importation of aurms.
To expect such an arrangement to bring anything but unrest, terrorism and ulti-
mately Nvar, is to live in a world of make believe. 
s
To better understand this "world of make believe," it is instructive to consider
the Charter of llamas, another terrorist organization that is central to current dif-
ficulties in implementing "peace." According to this Charter
Peace initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international con-
ferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the
Islamic Resistance Movement For renouncing any part of Palestine means re-
nouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Move-
ment is part of its faith, the movement educates its members to adhere to its
principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their
Jihad .... There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad ....
In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from
raising the banner of Rlaad .... We must imprint on the minds of generations of
Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a religious one, to be dealt with on this
premise .... Iswear by that vio holds in His Hands the Soul of Muhammad! I
indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will assault and kIll; a sult and
kill, assault and kill 37
Regarding relationships with the PLO, the Hamas Charter offers the following:
The PLO is among the closest to the Hlamas, for it constitutes a father, a
brother, a relative, a friend. Can a Muslim turn awuy from his father, his brother,
his relative or his friend? Our homeland is one, our calamity is one, our destiny
is one and our enemy is common to both of us .... 38
On the primacy of hatred toward Judaism, not Israel (i.e., Israel is despised be-
cause it is Jewish), the Hamas Charter states: "Israel, by virtue of its being Jewish
and of having a Jewish population, defies Islam and the Muslims. 'Let the eyes of
the cowards not fall asleep."' 39
After the assassination of terrorist Yechya Ayyash, known widely as "The En-
gineer," Yasser Arafat delivered a eulogy in Dura, near Hebron. Speaking before
a large crowd of Hamas supporters, Arafat praised all Palestinian "martyrs,"- in-
36. SeeA Palestinian State, JERusALEM PosT, Sept 27, 1995, at 10.
37. llamas Charter (Aug. 18, 1988) in ARAB-IsRAE.I Coicr AhM CO=1cIAroN,' 203,
206-07 (Bernard Reich ed., 1995). Hamas is the acronym for the Islamic Resistance
Movement, Harakat Muqawama Islamiyaa, meaning, literally, "enthusiasm," "zeal," "fa-
naticism." Id. at 203.
38. Id. at209.
39. Id. at 210.
40. Jon Immanuel, Arafat: Israel Responsible for Yilt'e Ayyesh's Liquidation,
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cluding those who had murdered Israeli women and children in schools, buses
and homes. Referring to the imminent takeover of Jerusalem from the Jews, Ara-
fat was quoted at a meeting of Arab dignitaries as saying, "You understand that
we plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian state. I
have no use for Jews; they are and remain Jews."4 1 Arafat further announced in an
appearance before Palestinian forces on September 24, 1996, that, "[t]hey will
fight for Allah, and they will kill and be killed .... Palestine is our land and Je-
rusalem is our capital."42
At a eulogy delivered on June 15, 1995, for Abed Al Karim Al Aklok, a former
PLO official, Arafat remarked, "We are all seekers of martyrdom in the path of
truth and right toward Jerusalem the capital of the State of Palestine .... We will
continue this difficult Jihad, this long Jihad, this arduous Jihad,43 in the path of
martyrs - via death - the path of sacrifice .... "44 On January 30, 1996, at the
Grand Hotel in Stockholm, Sweden, Arafat delivered a speech to forty Arab dip-
lomats on "The Impending Total Collapse of Israel." Said Arafat, "We Palestini-
ans will take over everything, including all of Jerusalem .... All the rich Jews
who will get compensation will travel to America." Arafat continued, "We of the
PLO will now concentrate all our efforts on splitting Israel psychologically into
two camps. Within five years we will have six to seven million Arabs living on
the West Bank and in Jerusalem .... You understand that we plan to eliminate
the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian State .... I have no use for
Jews; they are and remain Jews. We now need all the help we can get from you in
our battle for a united Palestine under total Arab-Moslem domination.
' 45
JERUSALEMPOST, Jan. 8, 1996, at 1.
41. Alan Bergstein, Arafat Does Not Deserve Peace Prize, SUN-SrTrmbnL (FT.
LAUDERDALE, FL.), April 22, 1996, at 10A.
42. State of Israel, Prime Minister's Office Issues List of Major PLO Violations (Oct.
24, 1996) (citing MAAiv, Oct. 4, 1996) (on file with the American University Journal of
International Law and Policy). This on-line report additionally asserts that Arafat "has
repeatedly called forfihad (holy war) against Israel, praised prominent terrorists ... and
encouraged acts of violence against Israelis." Id.
43. See ROBERT S. Wisnucii, ANTsEMiSM: TnE LONGEST HATRED 222-39 (1991)
(discussing Jihad ("holy var")). For fundamentalist Muslims, says Wistrich, "peace with
Israel was and still remains nothing less than a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam, a
symptom of its profound malaise, weakness and decadence." Id. at 227. According to Is-
lamic orthodoxy, the Prophet is said to have predicted a final war to annihilate the Jews.
See ARAB THEOLoGIANS ON JEWS AD IsRAEL: ExTRAcTs FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF Tim
FoURTH CONFERENcE OF THE ACADEmy OF ISLAMIC REsEARCH 9 (D.F. Green ed., 3d ed.
1976) [hereinafter EXTRACTs], cited in WIsTRIcH, supra, at 230. Mohammed, it is re-
ported, had stated: "The hour (i.e., salvation) will not come until you fight against the
Jews; and the stone would say, '0 Muslim! There is a Jew behind me: come and kill
him."' See EXTRACTS, supra, at 51.
44. See Arafat Speaks to the Arabs, CAucus CuRRENT, Oct. 1995, at 16.
45. See Arafat Predicts Destruction ofIsrael, HEBRON TODAY, Feb. 14, 1996 (empha-
sis added). See also Avrohom Shmuel Lewin, Arafat Urges "Destroy Israel", J1WISH
PREss, Feb. 9-Feb. 15, 1996, at 1.
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Regarding the Oslo Accords and Israel's vulnerability to war,45 Israeli security
is now increasingly dependent upon nuclear weapons and strategy47 Faced with a
codified and substantial loss of territories - a loss that might still be enlarged by
transfer of the Golan Heights to Syria48 - the Jewish State will have to decide on
how to compensate for its diminished strategic depth. 49 While this shrinkage does
not necessarily increase Israel's existential vulnerability to unconventional missile
attack, it certainly does increase that state's susceptibility to attacling ground
forces and to subsequent enemy occupation. Moreover, enemy states will almost
certainly interpret the loss of strategic depth50 as a significant weakening of Is-
46. It should be understood that this vulnerability strongly correlates vith a vulner-
ability to genocide. War and genocide need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, Nar might
well be the means whereby genocide is operationalized According to Article 11 of the
Genocide Convention, 1951, genocide includes any of several acts "committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such ... ."
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art II Dec. 9,
1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (1951). It follows that where
Israel is recognized as the institutionalized expression of the Jewish People (an expression
that includes national, ethnical, racial and religious components), acts of var intended to
destroy the Jewish State could assuredly be genocidal.
47. See Louis Ren6 Beres, The Argument for Israeli Nuclear Feapons, 41
MmsTREAM, May 1995, at 2-6. See also Louis Ren6 Beres, Power and Survival. Wi, Is-
rael Needs Nuclear Weapons, 26 I'r'L J. STEDY OF GROUP TmisloNs 21, 21-59 (1996)
(noting the reaction and comment by Brigadier General (Res.) Aharon Levran, former
Deputy Chief IDF Intelligence Branch).
48. See Beres and Shoval, Demilitarizing a Palestinian "Entity", supra note 36, at
959-71. Zalman Shoval is Israel's former Ambassador to the United States.
49. Regarding the concept of strategic depth, this critical issue was addressed as early
as June 29, 1967, when a United States Joint Chiefs of Staff ("JCS") Memorandum speci-
fled that returning Israel to pre-1967 boundaries would drastically increase its vulnerabil-
ity. The then Chairman of the JCS, General Earl Wheeler, concluded that for minimal de-
terrence and defense, Israel should retain Sharm el Sheikh and Wadi El Girali in the Sinai;
the entire Gaza Strip; the high ground and plateaus of the mountains in Judea and Samaria
(West Bank); and the Golan Heights east of Quneitra. In October 1988, almost ten years
ago, 100 retired United States generals and admirals, seven of four-star rank, issued a
statement urging Israel not to withdraw from Judea and Samaria. The statement read, in
part, as follows:
mhe Samarian and Judean high ridges cannot be effectively denilitarized or ad:-quakly incp.cted. If
Irael loses its extensive earlyiwarning fine, it ould have virtually no wrning ofatack.... To re.
main strong, Israel must retain the Jordan River as its eastern border. Pressing Israel to uithdraw
from this line will bring neither peace nor servaAmerica's interests.
See Gail Winston, Israel's Chief of Staff Cites US. Joint Chiefs of Staff on Israels Defen-
sible Borders, CAucus CuRRENT, Sept. 1993, at 25 (quoting the signed, fill-page adver-
tisement that appeared in the Washington Times).
50. For assessments of strategic depth and Israeli security, see HiRsH GoOD.A & W.
SaTH CARus, Tim FuruRE BATLEFIELD AD m ARAB ISRAELI Co. TucT (1990Y, Yohanan
Ramati & Shlomo Baum, Can Israel Survive the Loss of Judea and Samaria?, 38
MiDsTmAL, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 19-21; Edwsrd Saar, The West Bank and Modern Arms, I
NATTv 3,3-16 (1990); David Bar-Man, Mly a Palestinian State is Still a Mortal Threat,
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rael's overall defense posture, an interpretation that could lead to great incentives
for an enemy to strike first.
Implementation of the Oslo Accords would most certainly sacrifice Israel's
strategic depth and result in a Palestinian state. Furthermore, the geostrategic
victory of the Islamic world would lead to an Arab and Iranian5' perception of an
ongoing and unstoppable momentum against the Jewish State, a jihad-centered
perception of military inevitability that would reiterate the policies of war. Recog-
nizing such perceptions, Israel could be forced to take its bomb Out of the "base-
ment,-52 and/or it could have to accept a greater willingness to launch preemptive
strikes against enemy hard targets.5 3
For their part, certain Arab states 4 and/or Iran would respond to such Israeli
decisions. Made aware of Israel's policy shifts - shifts that would stem from both
Israel's Oslo-generated territorial vulnerabilities and from its awareness of enemy
perceptions spawned by the Oslo-generated creation of Palestine - these enemy
states could respond in more or less parallel fashion. Here, preparing openly for
CoMmENTARY, Nov. 1993, at 27-31. See also Beres & Gazit, supra note 36, at 15-23 (not-
ing this author's debate with Major General (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, former Chief of the Is-
rael Defense Forces Intelligence Branch).
51. For detailed consideration of the Iranian threat to Israel by this author, see Louis
Rend Beres, Israel, Iran and Prospects for Nuclear War in the Middle East, 21 STRATEoIC
REv., Spring 1993, at 52-60, Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Iran and Nuclear War: A Tactical
and Legal Assessment, SuRvY oF ARAB Ar. (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Nov.
1993), and Louis Rend Beres, The Iranian Threat to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions:
Preliminary Sketches for a Strategic Dialectic, INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE &
COUNTERNmTELLIGENCE , Dec. 1995, at 51-61.
52. See Louis Rend Beres, Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A Revisiting of "Deliberate
Ambiguity" vs. "Disclosure", ISRAELAFF., Autunm 1995, at 112-36.
53. For earlier writings by this author on the impact of a Palestinian state on Israel's
nuclear strategy, see Louis Rend Beres, The Oslo Accords and Israel's Nuclear Strategy,
GEORGETOWN COMPASS, Winter 1995, at 74, Louis Rend Beres, A Palestinian State and
Israel's Nuclear Strategy, CROSSROADS: AN Irr'L Soc.-PoL. J., at 97-104 (1991), Louis
Rend Beres, The Question of Palestine and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, POL. Q., Oct.-Dec.
1991, at 451-60, Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War, BULL.
PEACE PRoPOsALs, June 1991, at 227-34, Louis Rend Beres, A Palestinian State: Implica-
tions for Israel's Security and the Possibility of Nuclear War, BULL. JERusAtYnM INST. W.
DEF., Oct. 1991, at 3-10, Louis Rend Beres, Israeli Security and Nuclear Weapons, PSIS
OCCASIONAL PAPERS (Graduate Institute of International Studies), 1990, at 400, and Louis
Rend Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Mid-
dle East, 19 STRATEGICREv., Fall 1991, at 48-55.
54. Iraq remains among these enemy states. Iraq has been an active enemy of Israel
since the Jewish State's initial drive for independence. That country sent substantial expe-
ditionary forces against Israel in the 1948 War of Independence, the Six Day War (1967)
and the Yom Kippur War (1973). During the 1948 War, Iraqi forces entered Transjordan
and engaged Israeli forces in Western Samaria. In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Iraqi
forces, again deployed in Jordan, remained there for more than two years. During the 1973
War, Baghdad committed about one-third of its then 95,000 man armed forces to assist
Syria in its campaign against the IDF on the Golan.
[VOL. 12:2
OSLO ACCORDS
nuclearization and aggression against Israel, these states would illustrate certain
far-reaching effects of the Oslo Accords. These effects, which are still generally
unrecognized, together with other above-listed rationales, provide a fully authori-
tative basis for permissible abrogation.
For Israel, nuclear weapons are necessary for a variety of interrelated purposes
(all of which serve to prevent nuclear war). These weapons, however, do not im-
ply that Israeli territorial surrenders are reasonable.55 This is largely because Is-
rael could not make effective use of its nuclear weapons in response to the entire
range of military threats that might ensue from an Oslo-mandated loss of strategic
depth.
Since "ordinary" conventional war would be more probable after its territorial
surrenders, the Jewish State would likely need to confine its defensive reactions to
conventional forces. As Israel's enemies are aware of this, they could have height-
ened incentives to initiate belligerency. Here, it is sobering to recall that many of
Israel's enemies continue to deny Israel's very existence.5s Indeed, even Israel's
"friends" in the Middle East, i.e., Egypt and Jordan - states with which it is
formally "at peace" - do not include Israel on any of their maps. On these maps,
all of the territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea is called "Pal-
estine."
Ultimately, even if Palestine does not supplant Israel, the Oslo-mandated crea-
tion of a Palestinian state will weaken the Jewish state beyond repair. With such
creation, various enemy states, including Iran, could place weapons and launchers
in areas very close to Israel's major cities. Recognizing the strategic advantages of
such placement, enemy states and their terrorist surrogates could forge formal and
informal alignments against the Jewish state, stipulating joint and collaborative
actions.
55. See Brig. General (Res.) Aharon Levran, NuclearDeterrence atAny Cost, 9 NATIV
30, 30-36 (1996) (in Hebrew only).
56. The agreements that put an end to the first Arab-Israeli War (1947-1949) were not
peace settlements, but were general armistice agreements negotiated bilaterally between
Israel and Egypt on February 24, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 251-70 (1949). Israel and Lebanon on
March 23, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 287 (1949), Israel and Jordan on April 23, 1949, 42
U.N.T.S. 303 (1949), and between Israel and Syria on July 20, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 327
(1949). Pursuant to these agreements, the Security Council, on August 11, 1949, issued a
Resolution which, inter alia, '"noted with satisfaction the several armistice agreements,"
and "[finds] that the armistice agreements constitute an important step to%, ird the estab-
lishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers that these agreements supersede
the truce provided for the resolutions of the Security Council of 29 May and 15 July 1948."
RESOLUTIONS OF Tm PALESTNE QLSTION ADOPTED AT THE 437rH M11n0 OF THF
SECURITY COUNCIL ON 11 AUGUST 1949, U.N. Doc. S/1376, at II (1949). Vfith the excep-
tions of Egypt and Jordan, an authentic peace treaty has not superseded any of the
aforelisted armistice agreements.
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AN AFTERWARD ON ISRAELI CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN ABROGATING OSLO
Citizens of Israel, in the fashion of citizens of any democratic state, have the
right and the obligation to oppose the Oslo Accords with appropriate forms of
civil disobedience. Significantly, such right and obligation have prominent roots
in the ancient Jewish tradition of a Higher Law.5 7 In this tradition, God is unam-
biguously the source of all law. Here, law is an aspect of the divine order of the
cosmos. The Torah reflects both God's transcendence and immanence. The basis
of obligation, which concerns us presently in the context of civil disobedience, in-
heres in the law's transcendent character.5s
The right to civil disobedience is well-established in democratic legal theory.
Derived from the idea of a Higher Law, this right is more compelling when the
state's very survival is being placed at risk by government. Moreover, the right of
civil disobedience can become an outright obligation when a government's actions
run counter to the Nuremberg Principles.
American history provides an analogous situation. In the years before the Civil
War, thousands of American citizens organized an Underground Railroad to as-
sist those fleeing from slavery. At that time, the federal government judged those
who took part in this movement as lawbreakers, and often imprisoned them under
terms of the Fugitive Slave Act.59 Today, however, it is authoritatively recognized
that the true lawbreakers of the period were those who had sustained a slavery
system, and that every individual who acted correctly to oppose this system had
been genuinely law-enforcing. Similar patterns of recognition should now emerge
regarding the anti-Oslo movement within Israel.
57. Jewish Law (Halakhah) rests upon twin principles: the sovereignty of God and the
derivative sacredness of the Person. Both principles, intertwined and interdependent, un-
derlie the argument for civil disobedience in Israel against Oslo. On the importance of the
dignity of the Person to the Talmudic conception of law, see SAMuEL BEmN, IN HIS hAAOE:
TBE JEWISH PHILosopHy oF MAN As ExPREssED IN RABBINIc TRADImoN (1960). From the
sacredness of the Person, which derives from each individual's resemblance to divinity,
flows the human freedom to choose. The failure to exercise this freedom, which is evident
wherever response to political authority is automatic, represents a betrayal of legal respon-
sibility. For a discussion on the human freedom to choose good over evil, see JosEPH B.
SOLOVEITornc, THOUGHTS AND VISIONS: THE MAN oF LAW 725 (1944-45). Jewish Law is
also democratic in the sense that the law belongs to all of the people, a principle reflected
in the Talmudic position that each individual can approach God and pray without priestly
intercession. This points toward a fundamental goal of law to be creative, to improve soci-
ety and the state, a goal to be taken seriously in current evaluations of the pennissibility of
civil disobedience in Israel.
58. See generally AARON M. ScHREmER, JEwIsH LAW AND DEcISiON-MAKING: A STuDY
OF THROUGH Tnvj 191-225 (1979) (illustrating the transcendental character of law in rela-
tion to Talmudic law).
59. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 stat. 462 (1850) (amending Act of Feb. 12, 1793,
ch. 7, 1 Stat 302) (repealed 1864). Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act to regulate the
surrender and deportation of escaped slaves who fled into another territory or "free" state.
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In addition to a right to civil disobedience, Israel should also recognize its citi-
zens' inherent right to civil resistance. Acts of nonviolent civil resistance-acts
specifically intended for the purpose of preventing or impeding ongoing criminal
policies on the part of a government (e.g., acts intended to stop illegal terrorist
releases in Israel)--are not crimes. In contrast to classic instances of nonviolent
civil disobedience, where the persons committing such acts traditionally accept
punishment as a demonstration of commitment to law,^ civil resistance is essen-
tially law enforcing. Hence, because those engaging in civil resistance act in com-
pliance with incontrovertible human rights, they do not warrant punishment in
any form, but acquittal and broad public approval.60
Israeli citizens may now take note of certain remedies available to citizens of
the United States, which should also be available to them since both countries re-
main committed to international law. Two pertinent criminal cases in United
States courts are New York v. Jarkal and Streeter v. Chicago Transit Authority.2
Here, the defendants were acquitted by invoking the traditional common law de-
fense known as "necessity." This defense, which erases criminal liability for con-
duct that would otherwise be an offense (if the accused were without blame in cre-
ating the situation and reasonably believed that such conduct was necessary to
avoid a public or private injury greater than that which might reasonably result
from his/her own conduct) has broad applicability concerning egregious crimes.
Under the Oslo Accords, the Government of Israel has released thousands of
terrorists from imprisonment Yet, as we have already seen, no government has
the right to pardon in a lawful manner or to grant immunity to terrorists. In the
United States, it is clear that the constitutionally granted Presidential power to
pardon does not encompass violations of international law and is rather limited to
"offenses against the United States."o This limitation, as was noted earlier, de-
rives from a broader prohibition that binds all states to the overriding claims of
pertinent peremptory norms derived from Higher Law or the Law of Nature.64
When it was still apprehending and punishing terrorists, rather than releasing
them in compliance with an illegal agreement, Israel acted on behalf of all states.
When it began to release terrorists, some of whom had committed crimes against
other states, Israel acted against all states by illegally pardoning offenses com-
60. See generally FAcim A~m'orr Bom.., DEsmsnno Cnm RE SrAtcE UrDER
I Rmv oNAL LAw (1987) (noting the distinction betveen civil disobedience and civil
resistance).
61. Nos. 002170, 002196-212, 00214,002238 (Cir. CL, Lake City, IlL, Apr. 1985).
62. Nos. 85-108644, 48, 49, 51, 52, 120323, 26, 27 (Cir. Ct Cook City, Ill., May
1985).
63. See Jordan J. Paust, Contragate and the Invalidity of Pardons for Violations of
International Law, 10 Hous. J. INT'LL. 51, 52-3 (1987).
64. See id. at 51-52 n.4 (citing Ex Parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 312 (1856) as standing
for the proposition that a "pardon regarding things against the law of nature, or so far
against the public good as to be indictable at common law would be 'void,' including, pre-
sumably, offenses against the law of nations indictable at common law").
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mitted against other sovereigns.65 For Israel, the legal "bottom line" is that it pos-
sesses absolutely no right to grant any sort of immunity for any violations of in-
ternational law,6 especially for the egregious violations created by acts of terror.
Regardless of what might be permissible under the Oslo Accords, any freeing of
terrorists is legally impermissible. In fact, the principle is now well-established
that such freeing brings to the lawless state (in this case, the State of Israel) re-
sponsibility for past criminal acts and for future acts of criminality.
67
Under international law, Israel's Oslo-directed freeing of terrorists amounts to
an Israeli denial of justice. Such an implication has very serious operational con-
sequences. Although it is unclear that punishment, which is integral to justice,
deters future acts of terror, the far-reaching freeing of terrorists certainly under-
mines the legal obligation to incapacitate these particular criminals from the
commission of further acts of terrorism. Such freeing may also encourage others
to commit terrorist offenses in the future, whether against Israel or against other
states.
Should we choose to reject the peremptory expectations of Nullum crimen sine
poena68 and the intrinsic rationality of straight retributivism, it is clear that the
law must function to prevent future crimes. Here we may recall the well-known
65. See id. at 53 n.9 (citing authority that recognizes "an absence of power to pardon
offenses against other sovereigns" such as: United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285, 292
(C.C.D. Ore. 1884); In re Bocchario, 49 F. Supp. 37, 38 (W.D.N.Y. 1943); Carlesi v. New
York, 233 U.S. 51, 57 (1914); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410,420,430 (1987)).
66. See United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551) (regarding "an offence [sic] against the universal law of society ... no nation
can rightfully permit its subjects to carry it on, or exempt them .... "). See also Jordan J.
Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other
Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 283, 284-85 (1986) (stating
that violators of international law are subject to universal jurisdiction and exempt from
attempted grants of immunity).
67. In re Janes, 4 R. IT'L ARB. AwARDs 82, 87 (1991). Here, the arbitrators recog-
nized the "well-established principle... that, by pardoning a criminal, a nation assumes
the responsibility for his past acts." Id. at 96 (quoting In re Cotesworth & Powell, 2 INT'L
ARB. 2050, 2083, 2085 (1898)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TmE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STAT s § 711 (Tentative Draft No. 67, 1985) (citing In re
West, Decisions of Claims Commissions: Mexico-United States (1926-27) (supporting a
rule that obligates a state to act to punish crimes against aliens) (amnesty and pardon un-
duly granted)).
68. It is worth noting here that the "extradite or prosecute" formula under interna-
tional law - a formula now being violated daily by the Palestinian Authority's refusal to
extradite or punish terrorists - derives from expectations of Nullum crimen sine poena.
Developed in antiquity, this formula has roots in both natural law and in positive law. See
generally JEAN BODiN, THE Six BooKs OF A CoMmONwEALTH (Kenneth D. MacRae ed.,
Richard Knolles trans., 1962) (1576); HuGo GRoTtus, DE JuRE BELu Ac PACiS LmR TRns
(Francis W. Kelley trans., 1925) (1751); EMMmuCH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CoNDuCT ND AAmFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
SoVEREIGNS (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute 1916) (1758).
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argument of Plato's Protagoras:
No one punishes those who have been guilty of injustice solely because they have
committed injustice .... When anyone makes use of his reason in inflicting
punishment, he punishes not on account of the fault that is past, for no one can
bring it about that what has been done may not have been done, but on account
of a fault to come in order that the person punished may not again commit the
fault, that his punishment may restrain from similar acts those persons wvho vdt-
ness the punishment 69
In lawfully opposing Oslo, citizens of Israel can also resort to a remedy that
United States law provides to foreign nationals. Known as the Alien Tort Stat-
ute,70 this 18th century legislation passed by the First Congress in 17S9, provides
that federal district courts shall have "original jurisdiction of any civil action by




Two plaintiffs identified only as Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 are currently using
the Alien Tort Statute to bring a civil suit against Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of
the Bosnian Serbs. Endorsed by the Clinton Administration, this suit uses courts
in the United States to enforce peremptory standards under international law.72
The federal courts of the United States could now also be used to enforce these
standards in the matter of Yasser Arafat, a known terrorist. Although there is
certainly a negative precedent for such a civil suit in the case of Tel-Oren v. Lib-
yan Arab Republic73 - a case in which the plaintiffs, mostly Israeli citizens, were
survivors and representatives of persons murdered in an armed attack on an Is-
69. See PLATO, Protagoras, in PLAToNeICDALOGS § 324. See also PLATO, Gorgias, in
THE DIALoarus OF PLATO § 525 (Benjamin Jowett, M.A. trans., Random House 1937)
[hereinafter DIALoa-ss]; Republic, in DIALOGUES §§ 380, 615; Phardo, in DLLcaurs, su-
pra, § 113; PLATO, Laws, in PLATO §§ 854, 862, 934, 957 (Lane Cooper trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1938).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). This statute authorizes the United States federal courts
to adjudicate civil claims by aliens alleging acts committed "in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States" when the alleged vvongdoers can be found in the
United States. Understood in terms of United States obligations, this means that terrorists,
When within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, can be brought into our federal
courts for civil remediation of their crimes.
71. Id.
72. See Neil A. Levis, U.S. Backs War - Crimes Lawsuit Against Bosnian Serb
Leader, N.Y. Tnms, Sept. 27, 1995, at A10. The two plaintiffs contend that Karadzic is
responsible for harms they suffered in the Balkans, namely rape, mutilation and murder.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which is now considering
the case, has a history of favoring such lawsuits. It has ruled in the past that torturers and
dictators may be sued in United States federal courts for acts that occurred abroad and that
a judgment may be enforced if the subjects come to the United States or their assets are
located in this country. Dr. Karadzic was served with papers as he malked outside his hotel
room in New York City in February 1993.
73. 726 F. 2d774 (D.C. 1984).
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raeli civilian bus in March 1978 - there are substantial differences between Tel-
Oren and the proposed civil action against Yasser Arafat. Moreover, the Filartiga
case74 provides positive precedent for use of the Alien Tort Statute. Although Fi-
lartiga deals with torture rather than with terrorism, it did not end ultimately in
dismissal.
The decision of the Second Circuit in Filartiga established, inter alia, that
Section 1350 opens the federal courts of the United States for adjudication of the
rights recognized and established by international law. Although international
law does not itself determine when a wrongful deed is actionable, it does neces-
sarily presume - in our decentralized, Westphalian system of world legal
authority -that individual states will make such necessary determinations and
will act accordingly. While it is true that international law, in the absence of a
specific treaty or agreement, can not require any particular actions by particular
states,7 5 the incorporation of international law into domestic law in the United
States is well-established and unquestionable.7 6 With these facts in mind, Israeli
citizens may now use the Alien Tort statute of the United States, in conjunction
with other proper avenues of political and jurisprudential action, to oppose the
very considerable existential harms generated by the illegal Oslo Accords.
74. Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 40 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
75. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TBE CONSTITUTION 224 (1972); Louis
HENI N, ET AL., INTERNATiONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 116 (1980); CHARLES Cn-NEY
HYDE, IThERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEY As hiTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
729 n.5 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
76. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, international law
forms part of the law of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (asserting that United States law incorporates interna-
tional law); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that the
"concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant interna-
tional standards has also been embodied in the principle of 'universal' violations of inter-
national law").
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